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Contemporary issues of family conceptualiza‑
tion in France, from crisis of social integration to 
“Mariage pour tous”
In memory of my beloved maternal grandfather Louis Vezzoli (1923–2016)
Today’s family is neither more nor less perfect than that of 
yesterday; it is different because circumstances are different. It 
is more complex because the environment in which it exists is 
more complex. And that is all.
(Émile Durkheim, Introduction to the Sociology of the Family, 1888)
Introduction
Considering the classical sociological viewpoint, family appears as the basic 
institution of social life. Because of the specific anthropological organization of 
breeding in modern societies, most of us live through an important experience 
of family relationships, in terms of education, of everyday life, and of the first 
ordeals of life. For sure, the French society and its formal and social institutions 
show an historical significance of family during its construction. Most of people 
spend many years living with other individuals considered “family,” from the 
parents to, sometimes, the person chosen to start a family with.
People considered family are generally linked to different kinds of events and 
rituals of social life, like weddings, anniversaries, Christmas, funerals, etc. But 
this appearance of continuity created by the faces and the rhythm of personal 
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meetings must not hide recent evolutions and important differences within the 
concept of family, and certainly between different social contexts. Beyond the 
impression that family is related to intimacy, the State and the society remain 
concerned with many aspects of its social construction. Moreover, we can remark 
after Béatrice Houchard that the political field hasn’t forgotten the question of 
the family but has been making this topic more and more explicit since the end 
of the 1990s1.
Despite the construct of a commonsense representation of a “normal family” 
prevalent since the 19th century in France known for conjugal and heteronor‑
mative features, one can come up with more and different ways to build and 
claim a  family. Generally speaking, the constitution of a  couple became more 
complex since the 1960s (Kaufman, 1993), through the “contractualisation of 
the couple links” (Théry, 2001: 498). The valuation of the individual experience 
seemed to transform the social mechanisms linked to family (De Singly, 2007). 
By elsewhere, the recent decades showed a  decrease of the duration and the 
volume of the families. In 2008, there were 129 400 divorces (that is to say 10.6 
per 1000 married couples), against 38  900 (that is to say 3.3 per 1000 married 
couples) in 19702. In 2011, 1.5 million (11%) children under 18 lived in blended 
families and 2.5 million (18%) in single ‑parent families (Lapinte, 2013).
More recently, important legislative transformations lead to official full 
recognition of same ‑sex couples that in the collective imagination were the less 
legitimate form between the various types of “new families” (i.e., blended and 
single ‑parents families). This evolution tends towards complexity in a way as to 
consider the model of the contemporary nuclear family. Some observers came 
to talk about a  ‘désinstitutionnalisation’ of the family observed through the 
growth of the importance of individual decision and its consequences (divorces, 
acceptance of one’s sexual orientation, choice not to have children, etc.). This 
viewpoint entails the impulse to quickly conclude the reign of the individual 
choice and its allegedly subsequent state of common social uncertainty caused 
by the destabilization of the family. Nevertheless, because it sounds close to 
current representations and is used as an argument in the few harsh reactions 
to the recent evolution concerning the legal recognition of homosexual unions, 
we must take it seriously and analyze the contemporary issues concerning the 
institutions of the family in France and what we can call, with the words of 
Jean ‑Hugues Déchaux (2008, 2010), a change in the regulation of the family.
As this chapter is intended for non ‑French readers, it will start with provid‑
ing general information concerning the sociohistorical and political construction 
of the concept of the family in France, and also emphasizing different changes 
1 She recalls that before the 2000s, “family, children, nurseries, ‘nannies’, babysitters, were 
old wives’ business or, on a more political level, a  topic of the extreme ‑right wing” (Houchard, 
2001: 36, trans. S.B.).
2 http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?ref_id=T10F032.
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in the “model” since the 1960s. Having done that, the discussion will focus on 
contemporary shifts and the specific uncertainty they bring to show that the 
change in the regulation of the family cannot be explained only by moral and 
private mechanisms, but also by external aspects linked to two quite opposing 
dynamics: on the one hand, the propagation of democratic principles inside 
a social institution mainly built on gender inequality calls into question several 
certainties; on the other hand, socioeconomic precariousness and a  wider lack 
of social recognition that can lead people to have difficulties with accepting the 
widening of access rights for other people as in the case of the “Mariage pour 
tous” (“Marriage for everyone”).
The evolution of the representations 
of the French family model
The French society appears solidly founded on the institution of the family. 
As historians and sociologists recall even recently, the family in general (and the 
marriage in particular) was the subject of institutional work by the State or the 
Church, first synchronously (under the Old Regime) then in a kind of competi‑
tion (following the French Revolution). Indeed, the Civil Code adopted in 1804 
under Napoleon’s reign promoted a  specific role of the State in the marriage 
and then in the family shape. The authorities sought to diminish the effects of 
filiations by recognition of benefits to couples of parenting, providing legal and 
tax benefits to married persons.
It could be said that the benefit of marriage from the standpoint of the 
Church is more a moral (or indivisible) good: the sacrament of marriage means 
that this aspect of life is right with God. Today, we can also conclude that the 
objectification of a  relationship by marriage is linked to another moral good 
called love.
The very first example of sociology taking interest in family (with Émile 
Durkheim and his first lessons about family at the end of the 19th century) is 
widespread in these issues: how family can be considered as the base of the mod‑
ern society, and how its stability is important to strengthening it and avoiding 
anomy.
In the classical sociological approach, family is one of the key social in‑
stitutions, a  central agency of socialization (with school and peers). It is also 
a  mechanism by which individuals have been integrated into wider workings 
of community and society. The main question of sociology was how to con‑
sider the modern family and its functions in the general division of work? 
The large movement of individualization and the growing consumer society 
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first produced a  main change that can be summed as follows: “older forms 
of patriarchal control based on control of family production and labor were 
eroded, but were ultimately replaced by new forms based on the ideal of the 
male breadwinner and dependent, domesticated wife” (Jackson, 1999: 163). We 
can add that children progressively took on a specific role, with a later integra‑
tion in the world of work (education, school, etc.) and more and more attention 
required to their development. This has something to do with the concept of 
“care” which also describes the gendered role of women in the world of work, 
stemming from the “natural” nurturing capacities popularly attributed to 
women.
In the first part of the 20th century, France adopted very specific laws 
structuring a  family policy: linked to the professional categories, family allow‑
ances were created (1932) whose amount was to finally become independent of 
the incomes and the enterprise (1938); then, the creation of a  family quotient 
(1945) enabled the tax burden for families bringing up children to be markedly 
reduced. The very precise attention of the State to the family can be found in 
these specific disposals of the Welfare ‑State, which constitute the financial fam‑
ily support linked to the birth of the second child without means ‑testing3. We 
can note that France is one of the only countries in Europe that began to transfer 
family allowance from the second child, and not the first one.
After the Second World War and especially after the end of the 1960s, family 
was the focus of a sociopolitical deal. France started to leave the representation 
of the instrumental function assigned to men (“breadwinner”) and the expres‑
sive function for women (“care dealer” or “caretaker”). In the meantime, family 
was progressively represented as an endangered institution, and we can point out 
more precisely at least three main evolutions:
 – First, the progressive legitimization of moral changes including sexuality 
generally linked both to the emergence of the specific ethos of the consumer 
society and to the revolution of customs and habits around May 1968, 
representing the choice of a  private life governed by individual choice. This 
was supposed to bring about consequences in terms of re ‑assessment of the 
traditional model of family, new sexual behaviors and also the progressive 
diminution and adjournment of fertility: women had nearly 3 children 
after the Second World War which number dropped to less than 2 after the 
mid ‑1970s and presently4, and the average age of a mother at the birth of her 
first child increased from 23,9 years ‑old in 1970 to 28,1 years ‑old in 20105.
3 Until July 2015, all the attempts to introduce means ‑testing failed face to the strong objec‑
tions raised after their announcement.
4 http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/detail.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=bilan ‑demo&page=donnees‑
 ‑detaillees/bilan ‑demo/pop_age3c.htm.
5 https://www.ined.fr/fr/tout ‑savoir ‑population/chiffres/france/naissance ‑fecondite/age ‑mo
yen ‑maternite/.
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 – Secondly and more specifically, the progressive formal equalization of rights 
between men and women since the 1960s called into question unequal habits 
prevalent in the French patriarchal system. After the reform of matrimonial 
regimes in 1965 (French women no longer need the consent of their husbands 
to choose a profession or to open a bank account and have their own property), 
other advances occurred in the 1970s, from the formal end of the concept of 
the “head of household” and the replacement of “paternal authority” by “pa‑
rental authority” codified by the Law in 1970, to the introduction of divorce by 
mutual consent and promulgation of the law allowing abortion in 1975. This 
period has brought notable progress in terms of women’s situation. Beyond 
the new encouragement for women to make individual choices so as to reach 
happiness, the progressive equalization also meant more chances for women 
in general to be independent, in terms of rights or incomes for example. Of 
course, few consequences linked to these evolutions, like the high rates of 
divorces or the increase in single parenthood, caused concerns even criticisms 
from the partisans of the “traditional” model of family. Like in many other 
situations of the social life, the commonsense considers the troubles inside the 
“normal” social category (i.e., heterosexual couples) as individual exceptions 
but the troubles inside the other categories are still apprehended as a potential 
risk for the “normal”/average individuals.
 – Finally and more rarely mentioned, the family reunification policy after 1975 
helped people (primarily men) concerned by labor immigration to consider 
the opportunity to settle in France normally. This can be considered as 
a progress in human rights by the public wish to limit the instrumental use 
of people forced to emigrate from countries that were generally former French 
colonies in Africa. However, we must remind the negative and stereotyped 
image of these “traditional” families including a multitude of children, poor 
command of the French language and massive relegation to the disadvantaged 
districts or suburbs of the French cities. The French society, until the focali‑
zation of civil insecurity linked to the young people from suburbs from the 
1990s, could convey a global negative image of immigrant families, in some 
way still perceived by some people as a  threat. Now, their children form, in 
the collective representations, the new “dangerous classes” that were initially 
composed by the inhabitants of poor urban areas in the 19th century. In 
socioeconomic terms this evolution brought a  new lower class consisting 
chiefly of African immigrants and their children. Indeed, according to the 
Observatoire des inégalités (French Observatory of Inequalities), immigrant 
households6 more often than other live in uncomfortable housing (2002) and 
6 If the household does not necessary signify one family, INSEE data of 2012 remind that 
“complex households” (i.e., composed of two families, few single people who do not constitute 
a family or single people and family) form only 5.2% of the 28.3 million households (http://www.
insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=amfd2).
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are less likely to own any whatsoever. In 20127 non ‑immigrant households 
had a  standard of living on average 1.5 times that of immigrant households 
and 17.2% of immigrants were unemployed against 9% of the French born 
in France (2013)8. The problem is, parallel to the shifts in the composition 
of the popular classes becoming almost synonymous with immigrant people, 
that the French society increased its control on the private sphere. As Serge 
Paugam notices, “public policies have undoubtedly strengthened over the last 
decade control of popular families suspected of not ensuring the minimum 
conditions for child rearing” (Paugam, 2014: 342, trans. S.B.). Yet in terms of 
another aspect of the private sphere, namely the sexual orientation, France 
enacted quite more liberal legal provisions. The homosexual couples’ right to 
marry, allowed in many countries9 was introduced in France in May 2013, 
after several months of debates, by the so ‑called “Mariage pour tous”. Around 
17,500 new marriages have been celebrated in the first year and a half10.
The anxiety linked to socioeconomic protectionist dimensions 
of the family
Favorable customs and habits evolutions especially for women and children 
in the last decades cannot obscure a  quite stable importance of marriage in 
France. As Béatrice Houchard recalls, 86% of the population living in couples 
in France was well married at the end of the 1990s (Houchard, 2001: 18). One 
can claim that the question of the number is less important than the individual 
decision process. Some sociologists, focused on both the French culture of 
Welfare for each member of the family and the intimacy mechanisms shaped 
by rationalization, emphasize the role of individualism in numerous aspects of 
the sexual, romantic and familial experience (De Singly, 2007). Still, the issues 
of familial individualism cannot lead us to claiming the existence of a crisis of 
the familial bonds, and problematizing the family as an institution can also be 
 7 http://www.inegalites.fr/spip.php?page=article&id_article=832&id_rubrique=185&id_
groupe=17&id_mot=137.
 8 http://www.inegalites.fr/spip.php?page=article&id_article=86&id_rubrique=155&id_
groupe=17&id_mot=112. 10,000 marriages were celebrated in 2014, that is, 4% of all civil mar‑
riages in 2014 (around 241,000).
 9 Michel Huyette (2015: 26) recalls the list: Netherlands (2000), Belgium (2003), Spain and 
Canada (2005), South Africa (2006), Norway (2008), Sweden (2009), Portugal, Luxemburg, Ice‑
land, Argentina and Mexico (2010), Denmark (2012), Uruguay and New Zealand (2013), and few 
American states. We can also mention Brasil (2013), United Kingdom (2014), and Ireland (2015).
10 http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?ref_id=ip1532.
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understood as an aspect of democratization (Théry, 2001). In other spheres one 
also observes the alleged dissolution of norms, which are in reality becoming 
more present and more complex (Déchaux, 2010).
Despite the construction of both individual and conjugal discourse on mar‑
riage and especially the wedding ceremony, couples still seem to grant great 
importance to the family founded by means of this specific institution: firstly, 
because they do not appear so independent towards their family even if ado‑
lescence and early adulthood can nowadays be experienced as granting more 
independence when compared to the middle of the 20th century; secondly, this 
can be the occasion for the newlyweds to extend the definition of the family 
to their friends (Maillochon, 2011). So, the global distancing to the traditional 
model of linking of two families by business and/or as the pointer of endogamy 
is not replaced by a pure individual choice. The “family” as a normative concept 
is still present.
Furthermore, France remains a country where the State plays an important 
role: thanks to the historical construction of a  strong State and the advent of 
the Welfare State before and after the Second World War, the State can exercise 
power on the private sphere. The contemporary period brought other issues on 
the family which has to face the socioeconomic crisis lasting since the early 1990s. 
Previously, the social process brought new generations to the modernization of 
living conditions and a wider range of choice in society (within the meaning of 
family generation, that is to say as a position in the family, opposition to social 
generation, which reflects the spirit of an era touching a certain age group). There 
could be social reproduction or upward mobility but the general idea was an 
ameliorative process. For the first time in living memory new generations have 
less purchasing power, and experiencing an unprecedented precariousness. The 
problem is that the State intervention is not socially neutral. It has always been 
easier to step in poor families (that are used to poor reputation when dealing 
with public institutions linked to private life: health, school, social assistance, 
etc., not because of objective acts but cultural differences – language, behavior, 
beliefs, etc.).
After a few decades of trying to balance socioeconomic situations within and 
between families, most of the family policy focused on parenthood and educa‑
tion. In particular, it shifted to a children ‑centered viewpoint that works toward 
the oblivion of the preliminary social inequalities and the strengthening of the 
moral judgment of the parents in terms of education. But the family still plays an 
important role in the life course of people beyond the education of their children. 
This can be noticed in terms of the financial family solidarity towards the young 
generations: for example, a cultural enhancement of independence combines it 
with the legitimacy of the family to help during their studies. The French social 
model related to public policy strongly validated activation of familial and social 
solidarity between generations (Van de Velde, 2014). It institutionalizes a double 
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intergenerational tour: ascending through the pensions (of retirement) that bind 
the active generations to retired ones; down to the family level, a policy primarily 
directed towards seniors and devoted family solidarity in protecting more young 
people.
The State is thus present throughout the course, but in a much differentiated 
degree depending on age. Combined with a labor market focus on people 30–45 
years old, this regulation creates the category of the “fragile age” in the French 
society: family solidarity does not always compensate for difficulties at certain 
times in life, including the struggles of juniors/young adults and some “seniors.” 
Intergenerational solidarity plays an active role in safety, but might maintain 
social uncertainty: the young French are characterized by a particularly long and 
gradual attainment of independence, in which the first steps are taken relatively 
early, but the actual cash flow occurs much later. The mentioned parental soli‑
darities tend to be mobilized at an increasingly later age in France, particularly 
in the face of growing social problems.
For example, we can consider the global extension of the residential cohabi‑
tation with parents during the first decade of 2000 in Europe as an indicator. 
In France, the median age of this decision is around 23 years, which is at an 
intermediary level between Northern European societies and Mediterranean 
ones (Van de Velde, 2014). We can note that, for young adults, this can also 
appear as the mark of a  family solidarity rather than signal the difficulties in 
becoming materially and financially independent.
Some new forms of inequality are caused by the necessary use of family soli‑
darity: for example the return of the “inheritors” class in the sense that access 
to social positions is becoming more and more conditioned by access to family 
resources. Indeed, the intergenerational exchanges tend to reinforce inequality 
between social classes (Déchaux, 2007), from the construction of the social 
capital (including moral support from the elders that can feed self ‑esteem) to the 
financial assistance (including material or domestic support). To take another 
example, in 2012, the poverty rate of people living in single ‑parent families was 
20.5% that is to say two and a half times the national average (8.1%)11.
We can distinguish two levels of a  popular vision of a  “normal family”: its 
relational structures (married parents, children, common home, etc.) and its 
social behavior (which means, in sum, always responding to State injunctions 
and being able to speak the same language as its agents). This question is linked 
to the so ‑called “filiation’s link” (Paugam, 2014), a  general concept within the 
social links which is related to the social and formal duties between parents 
and children. This kind of a link is of varying power among individuals. It may 
break early. A mother who does not feel able to support and educate her child 
11 http://www.inegalites.fr/spip.php?page=article&id_article=1631&id_rubrique=145&id_
groupe=9&id_mot=76.
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may decide to give birth anonymously12. Some parents may lose their parental 
authority and have their children separated from them by the force of Law and 
placed in specialized educational institutions or foster care. In a  recent survey, 
conducted in the Paris area, French sociologists established that the proportion 
of people who no longer or virtually have no relationships with their father or 
mother, while these are still alive, is above 20% among the working class (27.9% 
for the father, the mother 21.3%) and decreases steadily as one climbs up the 
social ladder to a level below 5% among managers and high professions (4.3% to 
3.6% for father and mother) (Paugam, 2014).
Sociologists generally observe that the extent harshness of State penalties 
grows in direct proportion to the poverty of those it touches. There is a strong 
injunction that carries weight in lower classes and especially immigrant ones 
to remain in accordance with the Republic’s principles of education and secu‑
larism. In a  way, the private sphere that is family is more publically observed 
and judged. In the end, we can consider the lower classes to recognize and face 
more difficulties building stable families but that they are also more subject to 
criticism from the State about the education they give to their children. In that 
sense, it is not so astonishing that some fringes of the population had morally 
underpinned reactions against the recognition of same ‑sex couples, apart from 
the traditional opposition for religious reasons. If one risks a  statement that, 
contrary to popular belief, homophobia is not more pervasive amongst the lower 
classes but possibly takes different, class ‑specific forms (Fassin, 2005), one could 
speculate that a  particular feeling of injustice can foster the negative stance 
towards granting new rights to sexual minorities. 
The strictly bilateral concept of kinship – a child has a father and a mother, 
necessarily two adults of different sexes – has been undermined or problema‑
tized by blended families, the rise of adoption, use of assisted reproduction, and 
the exposition of homosexual unions as well as their aspiration to recognized 
parenting. For gay people, this recognition is an important new step since the 
decriminalization of homosexuality in 1982, the creation in 1999 of a  form 
of civil union alternative to marriage (not only for homosexual persons), the 
“Pacte Civil de Solidarité” or “PACS” (“Civil Solidarity Pact”) – which gave 
them less rights than the heterosexual marriage grants (Rault, 2007) – and the 
law criminalizing homophobia in 2004. Noteworthy, however, are the stormy 
and sometimes violent debates or demonstrations against this law, led by an 
assorted movement ironically self ‑designated “Manif pour tous” (“Demo for 
everyone”). It reminded that homosexuality today is still considered as crime 
in almost one hundred countries in the world, considered one of the “social 
scourges” alongside alcoholism and prostitution and, not long ago, a  mental 
12 This French legal provision affects a few hundreds children each year. These are then taken 
care of by the medical and social services (see Villeneuve ‑Gokalp, 2011).
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illness, removed from the register of diseases by World Health Organization 
only in 1992. Accordingly, the archaic vision of the homosexual still persists 
sometimes strengthened by religious concepts considering homosexuality as 
unnatural.
Nevertheless, in contrast with a  theoretically mediative and egalitarian 
model of the middle and upper classes, but also with the acceptance of alterna‑
tive sexual orientation, the lower classes model remains sometimes more solidly 
based on the compartmentalization of masculine and feminine roles and on 
children’s obedience (Le Pape, 2009). Contrary to the theory of the abandon‑
ment of authority, the problems noticed in the behavior of some children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds are less linked to unwillingness than to the impos‑
sibility of the parents to be there for them and face the problems. In some way, 
the opening of marriage to same ‑sex couples and the future prospect of allowing 
them to officially bring up children sounds contradictory to the residual tradi‑
tional family model of the French society.
Conclusion
This chapter looked at general features of family construction in the contem‑
porary French society and showed that with the recent complexity of customs, 
the institution of family suffers from a  paradox yet to be understood: on the 
one hand, it still remains stable in terms of representations of the aspiration it 
conveys, but on the other, its formal structure becomes more heterogeneous and 
some of its rituals are the object of reappropriation by more and more diverse 
social subclasses. As Dana Berkowitz shows in the American context (2011), 
gay parents are but one dimension of a broader family change; their increasing 
visibility coexists with a  decrease in nuclear heterosexual families and a  rise 
in lesbian families, single ‑parent families, blended families, voluntarily child‑
less heterosexuals, cohabiting heterosexual couples, and families constructed 
through adoption and assisted reproductive technologies.
One of the main problems of sociology is the difficulty to pay attention to 
these categories of thinking, remaining wary of the risks of essentialisms about 
sexual orientation and of the persistence of the patriarchal culture. Certainly, the 
very recent surveys seem to show the progressive acceptance of families built by 
homosexual couples, by public opinion, including their child rearing and care13. 
13 In 2014, an opinion poll showed that a (small) majority of people respond that they think 
that a child can grows in the same way in a family with two mothers or two fathers than in a fam‑
ily with a  father and a mother (http://adfh.net/wp ‑content/uploads/2014/10/112512_Ifop ‑ADFH‑
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Still, remaining sensitive and recognizing the anxieties causing not granting 
newly constructed families legitimacy could facilitate mutual understanding 
and acceptance, especially in the social groups where traditional family remains 
sometimes the only source and thus ideal of stability, and whose socioeconomic 
parameters have them at a disadvantage on the road to realization. 
In that sense, it should be important to never disconnect the thinking about 
customs and habits evolution with the socioeconomic contexts of their effective‑
ness. The next romantic and social revolutions, like the disconnection of love 
and sexuality and new forms of unions in Western countries like “polyamory,” 
being a critique of monogamy and exclusivism in romantic relationships (Varela, 
2015), will deeply problematize family again and opinion makers should pay at‑
tention to the general public’s reception of new forms of familial organization 
and unions.
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